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* This article was originally published 
in the February 2009 issue of the CTC 
Sentinel.
in the middle east, Salafism has gained 
prominence during the last two decades. 
This is especially true in countries such 
as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where 
a political version of Salafism, often 
labeled sahwa,  emerged as a significant 
social movement.1 In Yemen, however, 
the main Salafist trend is characterized 
by an apparently apolitical stance. It 
was developed by Muqbil bin Hadi al-
Wadi`i in the early 1980s around the 
Dar al-Hadith institute in the small 
town of Dammaj in Sa`da Province. 
Al-Wadi`i was a cleric educated in 
the 1960s and 1970s at various Saudi 
religious institutions (including the 
famous Islamic University of Medina) 
and maintained ambiguous links with 
that country’s rulers and religious elites 
until his death in July 2001.2 Rapidly, 
Dar al-Hadith expanded and educated 
thousands of students coming from 
Yemen and abroad; other institutes 
spawned in other regions of the country. 
Theoretically, the main features of that 
version of Salafism include a claim of 
loyalty to the political ruler (amir,  king 
or president) even when that ruler is 
corrupt and unjust, as well as a will to 
transcend local and national contexts 
by delivering a universal message based 
exclusively on the Qur’an and the hadith. 
These Yemeni Salafists aim to preserve 
Muslims from strife by not engaging in 
politics, nor participating in elections, 
demonstrations, or revolutions. Yet, 
they believe they can play a role in 
orienting state policies through advice 
given in private to the ruler. 
Such positions clearly distinguish 
Yemeni Salafism from other Islamist 
trends and figures—including radical 
Muslim Brotherhood-associated figures 
1  Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic 
Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
2 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Salafism in Yemen: A Saudisa-
tion?” in Madawi al-Rasheed ed., Kingdom without Bor-
ders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers 
(London: Hurst, 2008), pp. 245-262.
such as ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani3—who 
at least formally endorse elections and 
are stigmatized as sources of division 
and corruption by al-Wadi`i’s followers. 
Apolitical Salafists typically condemn 
violence and terrorist operations 
targeting civilians. In fact, al-Wadi`i 
was highly critical of the jihadist 
strategy at the global level as well as 
inside Yemen from the early 1990s 
onward. During that time, he accused 
Usama bin Ladin, who was then trying 
to launch new wars after Afghanistan, 
of preferring to invest in weapons rather 
than in mosques. He even apparently 
botched some of Bin Ladin’s planned 
operations against the socialist elites of 
South Yemen.4
While bridges between apolitical 
Salafists (or “purists,” as Quintan 
Wiktorowicz describes them5) and 
armed movements may exist, its frequent 
association with jihadist groups or its 
depiction as the antechamber of terrorism 
can be misleading. By focusing on the 
issue of violence, this article intends to 
show how the Salafist doctrine is often 
flexible and reinterpreted by clerics and 
activists. 
Yemen’s Salafists as Allies of Government?
In the post-9/11 period and after al-
Wadi`i’s death, condemnation of 
violence became a way for Yemen’s 
Salafist movement to legitimize its 
position in a precarious context. Such 
a condemnation was obviously not 
new but grew more explicit as state 
repression became a possibility.6 
Saudi sources condemning terrorism 
written by clerics close to the official 
religious establishment became more 
and more popular inside of Yemen.7 
3  Gregory Johnsen, “Profile of Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-
Zindani,” Terrorism Monitor 4:7 (2006): pp. 3-6.
4 On al-Wadi`i’s criticism of Usama bin Ladin, see 
Muqbil al-Wadi`i, Tuhfat al-mujib ‘ala as’ilat al-hadar wa 
al-gharib (Sana`a: Dar al-Athar, 2005), p. 281. Also see 
Brynjar Lia, “Destructive Doctrinarians”: Abu Musab al-Su-
ri’s Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current (Kjeller: Nor-
wegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007), p. 4.
5  Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Move-
ment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 9:3 (2006): pp. 
207-239.
6  “Zawjat Bin Ladin ta‘ud ila al-Yaman ma‘a ‘asharat 
min ‘anasir al-Qa‘ida,” al-Quds al-Arabi, December 29, 
2001.
7  Zayd Bin Muhammad al-Madkhali, Al-Irhab wa athar-
uhu al-sayyi’ ‘alâ al-afrad wa al-umam (Cairo: Dar al-Min-
haj, 2003), p. 128.
Essentially, these sources blamed the 
politicized Islamist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and some political 
Salafists—including famous Kuwaiti 
cleric ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq 
and Syrian Muhammad Surur Zayn al-
‘Abidin—for upsurges of violence. They 
also considered al-Qa`ida an anomaly. 
In such a context, the wide spectrum of 
Salafists in Yemen was eager to stress 
the fact that it would not endorse violent 
strategies against the state or its allies. 
Abu’l-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, the leader of a 
dissident Salafist fringe and writer of 
an anti-terrorism manifesto,8 along with 
his rival, Yahya al-Hajuri, supported 
Yemeni President `Ali `Abdullah 
Salih’s reelection for a new term during 
the 2006 presidential ballot. A few years 
before, Muhammad al-Imam, probably 
the most charismatic heir of al-Wadi`i, 
had delivered a speech at a conference 
in 2003 indirectly condemning jihad in 
Iraq against the U.S.-led occupation.9 
He claimed that in order to be legitimate, 
jihad had to be endorsed by the Yemeni 
government, which as a new ally of 
the United States in the “global war 
on terrorism” would obviously not do. 
Such an assertion considered Yemenis 
leaving for Iraq as illegitimate fighters. 
Through these steps, Salafists 
undoubtedly transformed themselves 
into allies of the Yemeni government 
in a matter that was reminiscent of the 
Saudi religious authority’s capacity to 
endorse its state’s policies and decisions 
in all circumstances. Despite their 
conservative and radical interpretation 
of Islamic jurisprudence, the Salafists 
appeared as advocates of loyalty or 
even moderation and as actors able to 
efficiently delegitimize violent strategies 
through theological arguments. 
Potential for Violence Remains
This image, however, is incomplete, 
and it obscures many of the practical 
inconsistencies of the Salafist movement 
in Yemen. Deeds might at times appear 
to directly contradict the peaceful and 
apolitical doctrine. In parallel to such 
condemnations of violence, Salafist 
individuals have supported actions 
8  Abu’l-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, Al-tafjirat wa al-ightiyalat : al-
asbab, al-athar, al-‘ilaj (Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004), p. 
295.
9  Muhammad al-Imam, “Hay ‘ala al-Jihad… lakin,” re-
corded conference, 2003.
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against various other political and 
religious groups, including socialists10 
and Sufis.11
The brutal rebellion  in Sa`da between 
the national army and a group of Zaydi 
revivalists12 headed by Husayn al-
Huthi and then his kin since June 2004 
emerged as another way for the Salafists 
to portray themselves as companions of 
the government. It also highlighted the 
Salafists’ potential for violence. Indeed, 
Salafists actively participate in the 
stigmatization of Zaydi identity. Their 
propaganda often associates Zaydism 
to Iran and to a global Shi`a conspiracy 
that seeks to divert the Muslim world.13 
In March 2007, two foreign students of 
the main Salafist center, Dar al-Hadith 
in Dammaj, were killed, supposedly 
in combat against Zaydi groups in the 
wider framework of the war against the 
“Huthis.”14 These killings confirmed the 
rumors that Salafist groups assisted the 
Yemeni army in the war. 
From a more global perspective, the 
positions defended by many Salafist 
clerics regarding the issue of jihad 
outside of their country (or more 
precisely outside of the Arab world) 
also show that both apoliticism and 
pacifism are not automatic options 
and that positions have been shifting. 
A clear example of internal practical 
contradictions appeared when al-
10  Muhammad al-Imam, Al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki fi rubu‘ qarn 
(Sana`a: Dar al-Athar, 2008), p. 32.
11 Alexander Knysh, “Contextualizing the Salafi-Sufi 
Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt),” 
Middle Eastern Studies 43:3 (2007): pp. 503-530. Also see 
Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim. Genealogy and Mobility 
across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2006), p. 5.
12  Zaydism is a branch of Shi’ism present in the Yemen 
highlands. The elites of this religious sect, which claimed 
to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (the sayy-
ids), ruled, under the authority of the imam, over parts 
or the whole of Yemeni territory for more than a millen-
nium, until the 1962 Republican Revolution. Since then, 
Zaydism has been in crisis and has experienced impor-
tant theological and political evolutions, some of which 
blunted the main features that distinguished it from Sun-
nism.
13  For examples of such stigmatization, see “Al-judhur 
al-fikriyya lil-fitna al-Huthiyya,” al-Muntada, April 2005 
or Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Mahdi, Al-Zaydiyya fi 
al-Yaman: Hiwar Maftuh (Sana`a: Markaz al-Kalima al-
Tayiba, 2008), p. 98.
14  “Al-Huthiyun yuhaimun ma‘had Dammaj al-salafi,” 
al-Taghiyir, March 26, 2007.
Wadi`i’s endorsement of jihad in the 
Molucca Indonesian Islands in 200015 
is confronted to his earlier criticism of 
Muslim Brotherhood Yemeni clerics, 
such as ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Daylami 
who labeled the 1994 war against the 
socialist-led secession a holy war. For 
al-Wadi`i, this was not the case, as 
labeling the war in this way would cause 
Muslim civilian casualties. 
Although September 11, 2001 and other 
operations were generally considered 
illegitimate and wrong since they 
had, in retaliation, fostered further 
casualties and war in the Muslim 
world, the condemnation of violence 
targeting Western interests is not 
systematic. In fact, the principle of 
confrontation between the West and 
the Muslim world is usually something 
that is acknowledged and supported. 
Nevertheless, in the dominant apolitical 
Salafists’ perspective, use of violence is 
considered counterproductive: Muslims 
are first of all not ready to fight as they 
are too weak and divided, and Muslim 
governments have not raised “the 
banner of jihad,” so fighting would only 
cause turmoil. In that context, while 
the general objective of targeting a 
dominant West might be supported, it 
can only be attained in the long run; all 
current attempts are then bound to fail 
and as such are negative. 
In various instances, al-Wadi`i showed 
an anti-imperialist rhetoric not very 
different from that of al-Qa`ida-type 
groups. In a 1996 conference, for example, 
he asked God to destroy America by 
sending “a heroic nation like the people 
of Afghanistan who destroyed Russia,” 
yet he denies being a terrorist, claiming 
he “is even incapable of shooting a gun 
correctly.” Furthermore, in the same 
conference he said the Salafists “are 
currently preparing the people to fight 
America through jihad” and recalled 
how “America corrupted the nations 
by supporting the governments and the 
tribes but never the Salafis.”16 Rather 
than a double standard discourse, these 
variations are better understood as ways 
of dealing with potential repression by 
15  Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and 
the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 2006), p. 115.
16  Muqbil al-Wadi`i, “Jawâhir al-sunniya fî al-as’ilat al-
faransiyya,” recorded conference, 1996.
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not appearing as dangerous proponents 
of overt violence, while at the same time 
showing the movement’s independence 
of speech in order not to lose its 
legitimacy among activists.
Conclusion
The ambiguous positions expressed 
by Yemeni Salafist clerics would tend 
to suggest that apolitical Salafists 
and jihadist groups only diverge in 
matters of strategy. Consequently, 
apolitical Salafism (such as the one 
forged by al-Wadi`i and his successors) 
would, according to this argument, be 
considered the antechamber of terrorism 
or its ideological roots. While not 
systematically incorrect (John Walker 
Lindh, the famous “American Taliban,” 
allegedly spent time in al-Wadi`i’s 
institute in Dammaj before leaving for 
Pakistan17), such an interpretation is 
biased. Indeed, it misinterprets the 
profile of most jihadist militants in 
Yemen as they in fact seldom have a 
strong religious background and do 
not use the apolitical Salafist clerics as 
legitimizing sources for their actions.18 
Drawing a genealogy of violence 
through the writings of Salafist clerics 
is therefore insufficient as it often 
means overlooking the environment in 
17  François Burgat and Muhammad Sbitli, “Les salafis 
au Yémen ou…la modernisation malgré tout,” Chroniques 
yéménites, 2003, p. 143.
18  See, for example, Sa‘id ‘Ubayd al-Jamhi, Al-Qa‘ida fi 
al-Yaman (Sana`a: Maktabat al-Hadara, 2008), p. 424; 
Mustafa Badi al-Lawjri, “Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-Dhaki-
ra,” undated, p. 218.
“These variations are 
better understood as 
ways of dealing with 
potential repression by not 
appearing as dangerous 
proponents of overt 
violence, while at the 
same time showing the 
movement’s independence 
of speech in order not to 
lose its legitimacy among 
activists.”
18
which these ideas are either produced 
or reinterpreted. For example, the case 
for loyalty is only bearable as long as 
the Salafists are not themselves the 
main victims of authoritarianism and 
indistinct criminalization. That is 
precisely what al-Wadi`i meant when 
he said:
If I am censored, there will be 
strong reactions…That is why I 
advise the government not to do it. 
You were courageous when people 
abroad accused you of harboring 
terrorists and you answered 
“No, we only have `ulama’ that 
teach the Qur’an and the sunna.” 
My brothers, I tell you, if the 
government was intelligent, it 
would leave us alone.19
As such, state repression and torture are 
probably more efficient incentives for 
violence than any given doctrine. As a 
fugitive militant accused of involvement 
in various attacks (including the one 
on the U.S. Embassy on September 17, 
2008) asserted in a press interview, 
“The operations that are happening in 
Yemen are reactions from young people 
tyrannized by torture in the prisons.”20 
While these words should be interpreted 
cautiously, they nevertheless show 
how the general political context plays 
a fundamental role. It is largely this 
context that will most often determine 
whether the Salafists, from the apolitical 
starting point, will be violent or will 
stick to the principle of strict loyalty 
to the state, or possibly start playing 
a more overtly political and inclusive 
game.
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The Current State of Al-
Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia
By Michael Knights
* This article was originally published 
in the September 2008 issue of the CTC 
Sentinel.
on may 12, 2003, the al-Qa`ida 
Organization in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) launched three simultaneous 
car bombing attacks on Western 
compounds in Riyadh, killing 35 civilians 
and short-circuiting the initiation of a 
long-planned terrorist campaign within 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi government responded quickly 
and fought a tough counterterrorism 
campaign throughout 2003 and 2004, 
reducing violence to a residual level 
from 2005 onwards. Five years after the 
2003 bombings and seven years after 
the September 11 attacks, the state of 
AQAP is difficult to judge. On the one 
hand, the number of major terrorist-
initiated attacks in Saudi Arabia has 
dropped from 30 in 2004 to a combined 
total of just six in the years since.1 
On the other hand, there is a constant 
trickle of disconcerting indicators from 
Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Interior, 
for example, announced 701 terrorist-
related arrests on June 25, 2008, the 
sequel to other announcements of 
mass arrests. Various Saudi ministries 
release a busy stream of alerts to other 
government departments and major 
Western businesses in the country, 
and the diplomatic security community 
regularly amends its security advice.2
What is the true state of AQAP five 
years after the May 2003 attacks? 
To scratch the surface of this query, 
this article draws upon a range of 
sources within the corporate security 
community in Saudi Arabia, within the 
Interior Ministry itself, and within the 
growing academic community focused 
on radicalization in the kingdom. 
These findings suggest that at present 
1   Also of note is that compared to 38 expatriate deaths in 
terrorist attacks in 2004, there have been four since.
2  The most recent of which occurred in August 2007, 
when both the Australian and UK Embassies issued 
warnings about a raised threat during Ramadan and 
with the U.S. State Department issuing a remarkably 
detailed alert about a threat to Westerners in downtown 
Riyadh in the “14-17 August 2008” period.
Saudi-based AQAP cells appear to 
be almost exclusively sympathizers, 
internet propagandists, recruiters and 
fundraisers focused on foreign jihad. 
Saudi Arabia does, however, face a 
potential threat from terrorists outside 
the kingdom, primarily from Yemen.
Recovery of Capability?
Since the collapse of high tempo terrorist 
activity in Saudi Arabia by the end of 
2004, the government has sought to 
maintain public vigilance and prevent 
the onset of complacency about the 
terrorist threat. This has been achieved 
by developing a series of strong themes 
in its public communications. The first of 
these themes is the assertion that AQAP 
is constantly attempting to recover 
capability, reconstitute networks and 
plan and undertake attacks within the 
kingdom. 
One or two major planned attacks have 
been foiled in Saudi Arabia each year 
since 2005. The most recent operation 
to have reached an advanced stage of 
preparation was the November 2007 
plot to undertake an attack on an Eastern 
Province oil facility by employing an 
assault team working in concert with 
a tactical rocket attack using weapons 
smuggled in from Yemen. The plot was 
foiled on November 25, 2007, just days 
before an execution date of November 
27-28. The assault group involved seven 
Saudis and one Iraqi, who the Ministry 
of Interior stated was the group’s 
leader.3 
Other major plots exposed in Saudi 
Arabia since 2005 have demonstrated 
serious intent but have lacked 
capability. In April 2007, videos 
released by the Ministry of Interior 
after a series of arrests showed small 
quantities of light weapons instead 
3  This information is drawn from personal interviews 
with government and corporate security analysts work-
ing in Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi Ministry of Interior 
contacts.
jAnuARY 2010 . spECIAL IssUE
“Yemen-based militants, on 
the other hand, present a 
significant threat to Saudi 
Arabia.”
